We demonstrate that it is possible to train large recurrent language models with user-level differential privacy guarantees without sacrificing predictive accuracy. Our work builds on recent advances in the training of deep networks on userpartitioned data and privacy accounting for stochastic gradient descent. In particular, we add user-level privacy protection to the federated averaging algorithm, which makes "large step" updates from user-level data. Our work demonstrates that given a dataset with a sufficiently large number of users (a requirement easily met by even small internet-scale datasets), achieving differential privacy comes at the cost of increased computation, rather than in decreased utility as in most prior work. We find that private LSTM language models are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to un-noised models when trained on a large dataset.
Introduction
Deep recurrent models like long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have become a standard building block in modern approaches to language modeling, with applications in speech recognition, input decoding for mobile keyboards, and language translation. Because language usage varies widely by problem domain and dataset, training a language model on data from the right distribution is critical. For example, a model to aid typing on a mobile keyboard is better served by training data typed in mobile apps rather than from scanned books or transcribed utterances.
However, language data can be uniquely privacy sensitive. In the case of text typed on a mobile phone, this sensitive information might include passwords, text messages, and search queries. In general, language data may identify a speaker-explicitly by name or implicitly, for example via a rare or unique phrase-and link that speaker to secret or sensitive information.
Ideally, a language model's parameters would encode patterns of language use common to many users without memorizing any individual user's unique input sequences. However, we know convolutional NNs can memorize arbitrary labelings of the training data [27] , and anecdotally, recurrent language models also appear capable of memorizing unique patterns in the training data. Recent attacks on neural networks such as those of Shokri et al. [23] underscore the implicit risk. The main goal of this work is to provide a strong guarantee that the trained model protects the privacy of individuals' data without undue sacrifice in model quality, building upon recent work in applying differential privacy to machine learning [11, 10, 16, 8, 6, 5, 18, 24, 22, 1, 20, 26] .
We are motivated by the problem of training models for next-word prediction in a mobile keyboard, and use this as a running example throughout the paper. This problem is well suited to the techniques we introduce, as differential privacy may allow for training on data from the true distribution (actual mobile usage) rather than on proxy data from some other source that would produce inferior models. However, to facilitate reproducibility and comparison to non-private models, our experiments are conducted on a public dataset as is standard in differential privacy research.
The remainder of this paper is structured around the following contributions:
1. We apply differential privacy to model training using the notion of user-adjacent datasets, providing a formal description of how models can be trained while respecting strong userlevel privacy guarantees. 2. We introduce a noised version of the federated averaging algorithm [17] in §2, which satisfies user-adjacent differential privacy via use of the moments accountant [1] first developed to analyze differentially private stochastic gradient descent (SGD) for example-level privacy. The federated averaging approach groups multiple SGD updates together, enabling large-step model updates. 3 . We demonstrate the first high quality LSTM language model trained with strong privacy guarantees in §3, showing no significant decrease in model accuracy given a large enough dataset. For example, on a dataset of 763,430 users, baseline (non-private) training achieves an accuracy of 17.5% in 4120 rounds of training, where we use the data from 100 random users on each round. We achieve this same level of accuracy with (4.6, 10 −9 )-differential privacy in 4980 rounds, processing on average 5000 users per round-maintaining the same level of accuracy at a significant computational cost of roughly 60×. Running the same computation on a larger dataset with 10 8 users would improve the privacy guarantee to (1.2, 10 −9 ). The additional computational cost could be mitigated by initializing by training on a public dataset, rather than starting from random initialization as we do in our experiments. We guarantee privacy and maintain utility despite the complex internal structure of the LSTM-with per-word embeddings as well as dense state transitions-by using the federated averaging algorithm. We demonstrate that the noised model's metrics and qualitative behavior (with respect to head words) does not differ significantly from the non-private model. To our knowledge, our work represents the most sophisticated machine learning model, judged by the size and the complexity of the model, ever trained with privacy guarantees, and the first such model trained with user-level privacy. 4. In extensive experiments in §3, we offer guidelines for parameter tuning when training complex models with differential privacy guarantees. We show that a small number of experiments can narrow the parameter space into a regime where we pay for privacy not in terms of a loss in utility but in terms of an increased computational cost.
We now introduce a few preliminaries. Differential privacy (DP) [12, 9, 11 ] provides a well-tested formalization for the release of information derived from private data. Applied to machine learning, a differentially private training mechanism allows the public release of model parameters with a strong guarantee: adversaries are severely limited in what they can learn about the original training data based on analyzing the model parameters, even when they have access to arbitrary side information. Formally, it says:
Definition 1 Differential Privacy: A randomized mechanism M : D → R with a domain D (e.g., possible training datasets) and range R (e.g., all possible trained models) satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets d, d ∈ D and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R it holds that However, for problems like language modeling, protecting individual examples is insufficient-each typed word makes its own contribution to the RNN's training objective, so one user may contribute many thousands of examples to the training data. A sensitive word or phrase may be typed several times by an individual user, but it should still be protected. 1 In this work, we therefore apply the definition of differential privacy to protect whole user histories in the training set. This user-level privacy is ensured by using an appropriate adjacency relation: Model training that satisfies differential privacy with respect to datasets that are user-adjacent satisfies the intuitive notion of privacy we aim to protect for language modeling: the presence or absence of any specific user's data in the training set has an imperceptible impact on the (distribution over) the parameters of the learned model. It follows that an adversary looking at the trained model cannot infer whether any specific user's data was used in the training, irrespective of what auxiliary information they may have. In particular, differential privacy rules out memorization of sensitive information in a strong information theoretic sense.
Algorithms for user-level differentially private training
Our private algorithm is based on FederatedAveraging (or FedAvg). This algorithm was introduced by McMahan et al. [17] for federated learning. In this setting, the goal is to train a shared model while leaving the training data on each user's mobile device. Instead, devices download the current model, and compute an update by performing local computation on their dataset. It is worthwhile to perform extra computation on each user's data to minimize the number of communication rounds required to train a model, due to the significantly limited bandwidth when training data remains decentralized on mobile devices. This algorithm, however, is also of interest even in the datacenter when DP is applied: larger updates are more resistant to noise, and fewer rounds of training can imply less privacy cost. Most importantly, the algorithm naturally forms per-user updates based on a single user's data, and these updates are then averaged to compute the final update applied to the shared model on each round. As we will see, this structure makes it possible to extend the algorithm to provide a user-level differential privacy guarantee.
We also evaluate the FederatedSGD algorithm, essentially large-batch SGD where each minibatch is composed of "microbatches" that include data from a single distinct user. In some datacenter applications FedSGD might be preferable to FedAvg, since fast networks make it more practical to run more iterations. However, those additional iterations come at a privacy cost. Further, the privacy benefits of federated learning are nicely complementary to those of differential privacy, and FedAvg can be applied in the datacenter as well, so we focus on this algorithm while showing that our results also extend to FedSGD.
Both of these algorithms are iterative procedures, and in both cases we make the following modifications to the non-private versions in order to achieve differential privacy:
A) We use random-sized batches where we select users independently with probability q, rather than always selecting a fixed number of users. B) We enforce clipping of per-user updates so the total update has bounded L 2 norm. C) We use different estimators for the average update (introduced next). D) We add sufficient Gaussian noise to the final average update.
The pseudocode for DP-FedAvg and DP-FedSGD are given in Figure 1 . Each of the changes above has the potential to influence the convergence behavior of the algorithm, and so we investigate them individually and together in §3. Taken together, items B) and C) (considered in §2.2 and §2.1 respectively) let us bound the sensitivity of each rounds' update to any one user's data. The sampling procedure from A) and noise added in D) then allow us to apply the moments accountant to bound the total privacy loss of the algorithm ( §2.3). Finally, in §2.4 we consider the properties of the moments accountant that make training on large datasets particular attractive.
Bounded-sensitivity estimators for weighted average queries
Randomly sampling users (or training examples) by selecting each independently with probability q is crucial for proving low privacy loss through the use of the moments accountant [1] . However, this procedure produces variable-sized samples C, and when the quantity to be estimated is an average rather than a sum (as in computing the weighted average update in FedAvg or the average loss on a minibatch in standard SGD with example-level DP), this has ramifications for the sensitivity of the query.
Thus, we introduce estimators for weighted averages to which we can apply the moments accountant. Specifically, we consider weighted databases d where each row k ∈ d is associated with a particular user, and has an associated weight w k ∈ [0, 1]. This weight captures the desired influence of the row on the final outcome. For example, we might think of row k containing n k different training 
Algorithm 1: The main loop for DP-FedAvg and DP-FedSGD, the only difference being in the user update function (UserUpdateFedAvg or UserUpdateFedSGD). The calls on the moments accountant M refer to the API of Abadi et al. [2] . The user update functions are parameterized by a clipping strategy and corresponding parameters, either FlatClip or PerLayerClip. Both use a local learning rate η and a batch size B, though typically B will be set much larger for FedSGD (for example, computing the gradient on the complete user dataset). examples all generated by user k. In federated learning, we wish to apply the weighted model
is the model update computed using data d k from user k (we abuse notation slightly by also writing d for the set of users in the database). More generally, we are interested in database queries of the form
where ∆ k is some vector depending on d k .
To save on computation and on privacy cost, it is beneficial to estimate this weighted average by sampling a small number of users. Here we consider the simplest approach, uniform sampling where each row is sampled independently with probability q, since this allows us to keep a tight bound on the privacy loss. Let C denote such a sample. We consider several ways to approximate f (d) using C. Let W = k∈d w k denote the total sum of the weights. A simple unbiased estimator isf
since qW is the expected weight of C.
Alternatively,f * (C) = k∈C w k ∆ k k∈C w k is a biased estimator, which sometimes may have lower variance, especially when only a small number of users are sampled. In order to control the sensitivity off * , we introduce a lower bounded denominator (with parameter W min ) as
When the updates ∆ k are highly correlated,f * gives a better estimate thatf f .
Bounding the sensitivity of the estimators For privacy protection, we need to control the sensitivity of an estimator f , defined as
, where the added user k can have arbitrary data. The standard way to limit the sensitivity of an estimator is by "clipping" each summand in the estimator to have bounded L 2 norm. For example, for given bound S > 0, we can apply the clipping projection
We remark here that clipping itself leads to additional bias, and ideally, we would choose the clipping parameter to be large enough that nearly all updates are smaller than the clip value. On the other hand, a larger S will require more noise in order to achieve privacy, potentially slowing training. We treat S as a hyper-parameter and tune it. We will discuss clipping strategies in more detail next. For now, assuming we have already applied clipping to each update, we can bound the sensitivity of (1) and (2):
Proof. For the first bound, observe the numerator in the estimatorf f can change by at most S between neighboring databases, by assumption. The denominator is a constant. For the second bound, the estimatorf c can be thought of as the sum of the vectors w k ∆ k divided by max(qW min , k∈C ∆ k ). Writing Num(C) for the numerator k∈C w k ∆ k , and Den(C) for the denominator max(qW min , k∈C w k ), the following are immediate for any C and C def = C ∪ {k}:
It follows that
Here in the last step, we used the fact that f c (C) ≤ S. The claim follows.
Clipping strategies for multi-layer models
To control sensitivity, Lemma 1 only requires that w k ∆ k is bounded. For simplicity, we only apply clipping to the updates ∆ k , using the fact w k ≤ 1, leaving as future work the investigation of weight-aware clipping schemes. For a model with a single parameter vector, we can simply take ∆ k = π(∆ k , S). However, for deep networks it is more natural to treat the parameters of each layer as a separate vector. The updates to each of these layers could have vastly different L 2 norms, and so it could be preferable to clip each layer separately.
Formally, suppose each update ∆ k contains m vectors ∆ k = (∆ k (1), . . . , ∆ k (m)). We consider the following clipping strategies, both of which ensure the total update has norm at most S:
1. Flat clipping Given an overall clipping parameter S, we clip the concatenation of all the layers as ∆ k = π(∆ k , S). 2. Per-layer clipping Given a per-layer clipping parameter S j for each layer, we set ∆ k (j) =
j . The simplest model-independent choice is to take S j = S √ m for all j, which we use in experiments. In our implementation of DP-FedAvg, we apply "greedy" clipping after each local update, following a standard approach for online gradient descent (see e.g. Zinkevich [28] ).
A privacy guarantee
Once the sensitivity of the chosen estimator is bounded, we may add Gaussian noise scaled to this sensitivity to obtain a privacy guarantee. A simple approach is to use an ( , δ)-DP bound for this Gaussian mechanism, and apply the privacy amplification lemma and advanced composition theorem to get a bound on the total privacy cost. We instead use the Moments Accountant of Abadi et al. [1] to achieve much tighter privacy bounds. The moments accountant for the sampled Gaussian mechanism upper bounds the total privacy cost of T steps of the Gaussian mechanism with noise N (0, σ 2 ) for σ = z · S, where z is a parameter, S is the sensitivity of the query, and each row is selected with probability q. Given a δ > 0, the accountant gives an for which this mechanism satisfies ( , δ)-DP. The following theorem is a slight generalization of the results in [1] .
Theorem 1 For the estimator (1,2), the moments accountant of the sampled Gaussian mechanism correctly computes the privacy loss with the noise scale of z = σ/S and steps T , where S = S/qW for (1) and 2S/qW min for (2) .
Proof. It suffices to verify that 1. the moments (of the privacy loss) at each step are correctly bounded; and, 2. the composability holds when accumulating the moments of multiple steps.
At each step, users are selected randomly with probability q. If in addition the L 2 -norm of each user's update is upper-bounded by S, then the moments can be upper-bounded by that of the sampled Gaussian mechanism with sensitivity 1, noise scale σ/S, and sampling probability q.
Our algorithm, as described in Figure 1 , uses a fixed noise variance and generates the i.i.d. noise independent of the private data. Hence we can apply the composability as in Theorem 2.1 in [1] .
We obtain the theorem by combining the above and the sensitivity bounds (1) and (2).
Differential privacy for large datasets
We use the implementation of the moments accountant from Abadi et al. [2] . The moments accountant makes strong use of amplification via sampling, which means increasing dataset size makes achieving high levels of privacy significantly easier. Table 1 summarizes the privacy guarantees offered as we vary some of the key parameters. The takeaway from this table is that as long as we can afford the cost in utility of adding noise proportional to z times the sensitivity of the updates, we can get reasonable privacy guarantees over a large range of parameters. The size of the dataset has a modest impact on the privacy cost of a single query (1 round column), but a large effect on the number of queries that can be run without significantly increasing the privacy cost (compare the 10 6 round column). For example, on a dataset with 10 9 users, the privacy upper bound is nearly constant between 1 and 10 6 calls to the mechanism (that is, rounds of the optimization algorithm).
There is only a small cost in privacy for increasing the expected number of (equally weighted) users C = qW selected on each round as long asC remains a small fraction of the size of the total dataset. Since the sensitivity of an average query decreases like 1 C (and hence the amount of noise we need to add decreases proportionally), we can increaseC until we arrive at a noise level that does not adversely effect the optimization process. We show empirically that such a level exists in the experiments. 
Experimental Results
In this section, we analyze the DP-FedAvg and DP-FedSGD algorithms while training an LSTM RNN tuned for language modeling in a mobile keyboard. We vary noise, clipping, and the number of users per round to develop an intuition of how privacy affects model quality in practice.
For many applications public proxy data is available, e.g., for next-word prediction one could use public domain books, Wikipedia articles, or other web content. In this case, an initial model trained with standard (non-private) algorithms on the public data (which is likely drawn from the wrong distribution) can then be further refined by continuing with differentially-private training on the private data for the precise problem at hand. Such pre-training is likely the best approach for practical applications. However, since training models purely on private data (starting from random initialization) is a strictly harder problem, we focus on this scenario for our experiments.
Our focus is also on training a single model which is shared by all users. However, we note that our approach is fully compatible with further on-device personalization of these models to the particular data of each user. It is also possible to give the central model some ability to personalize simply by providing information about the user as a feature vector along with the raw text input. LSTMs are well-suited to incorporating such additional context.
Model structure The goal of a language model is to predict the next word in a sequence s t from the preceding words s 0 ...s t−1 . The neural language model architecture used here is a variant of the LSTM recurrent neural network [15] trained to predict the next word (from a fixed dictionary) given the current word and a state vector passed from the previous time step. LSTM language models are competitive with traditional n-gram models [25] and are a standard baseline for a variety of ever more advanced neural language model architectures [14, 19, 13] .
The first step in training a word-level recurrent language model is selecting the vocabulary of words to model, with remaining words mapped to a special "UNK" (unknown) token. Training a fully differentially private language model from scratch requires a private mechanism to discover which words are frequent across the corpus, for example using techniques like distributed heavy-hitter estimation [7, 4] . For this work, we simplified the problem by pre-selecting a dictionary of the most frequent 10,000 words (after normalization) in a large corpus of mixed material from the web and message boards (but not our training or test dataset).
Our recurrent language model works as follows: word s t is mapped to an embedding vector e t ∈ R 96 by looking up the word in the model's vocabulary. The e t is composed with the state emitted by the model in the previous time step s t−1 ∈ R 256 to emit a new state vector s t and an "output embedding" o t ∈ R 96 . The details of how the LSTM composes e t and s t−1 can be found in [15] . The output embedding is scored against the embedding of each item in the vocabulary via inner product, before being normalized via softmax to compute a probability distribution over the vocabulary. Like other standard language modeling applications, we treat every input sequence as beginning with an implicit "BOS" (beginning of sequence) token and ending with an implicit "EOS" (end of sequence) token.
Unlike standard LSTM language models, our model use the same learned embedding for the input tokens and for determining the predicted distribution on output tokens from the softmax. This reduces the size of the model by about 40% for a small decrease in model quality, an advantageous tradeoff for mobile applications. Another change from many standard LSTM RNN approaches is that we train these models to restrict the word embeddings to have a fixed L 2 norm of 1.0, a modification found in earlier experiments to improve convergence time. In total the model has 1.35M parameters.
We evaluate using AccuracyTop1, the probability that the word to which the model assigns highest probability is correct (after some minimal normalization). We always count it as a mistake if the true next word is not in the dictionary, even if the model predicts UNK, in order to allow fair comparisons of models using different dictionaries. In earlier experiments, we found that our model architecture is competitive on AccuracyTop1 and related metrics (Top3, Top5, and perplexity) across a variety of tasks and corpora. Our experiments focus on AccuracyTop1 because that metric is simple to interpret and is well correlated with improvements to the typing experience on mobile keyboards.
Dataset We use a large public dataset of Reddit posts [21], as described by Al-Rfou et al. [3] . Critically for our purposes, each post in the database is keyed by an author, so we can group the data by these keys in order to provide user-level privacy. Since our goal is to limit the contribution of any one author to the final model, it is not necessary to include all the data from users with a large number of posts. On the other hand, processing users with too little data slows experiments (due to constant per-user overhead). Thus, we use a training set where we have removed all users with fewer than 1600 tokens (words), and truncated the remaining K = 763, 430 users to have exactly 1600 tokens. Thus we give each user weight w k = 1, so W = K. We writeC = qK = qW for the expected number of users sampled per round. To allow for frequent evaluation, we use a relatively small test set of 75122 tokens formed from random held-out posts. We evaluate accuracy every 20 rounds and plot metrics smoothed over 5 evaluations (100 rounds).
We intentionally chose a public dataset for research purposes, but carefully chose one with a structure and contents similar to private datasets that arise in real-world language modeling task such as predicting the next-word in a mobile keyboard. This is the ideal scenario for research in differential privacy, as working with a public datasets allows for reproducibility, comparisons to non-private models, and inspection of the data to understand the impact of differential privacy beyond coarse Table 2 : Privacy ( at δ = 10 −9 ) and accuracy after 5000 rounds of training for models with different σ and S from Figure 2 . The 's are strict upper bounds on the true privacy loss given the dataset size K andC; AccuracyTop1 (AccT1) is estimated from a model trained with the same σ as discussed in the text. aggregate statistics (for example, the analysis of the models' use of common vs rare words we will show in Table 3 ).
Building towards DP: sampling, estimators, clipping, and noise Recall achieving differential privacy for FedAvg or FedSGD required a number of changes to the basic algorithm: 1) Use random-sized batches where we select users independently with probability q, rather than always selecting a fixed number; 2) Choose an estimator for the average update, which might, for example, increase variance by using the expected weight of the sample rather than the actual weight; 3) Enforce clipping of user updates so the total update has bounded L 2 norm; and, 4) Add sufficient Gaussian noise to the average update. In this section, we run experiments to examine the impact of each of these changes in isolation, both to understand the immediate effects and to enable the selection of reasonable parameters for our final DP experiments. This sequence of experiments also provides a general road-map for applying differentially private training to new models and datasets. For these experiments, we use the FedAvg algorithm with a fixed learning rate of 6.0, which we verified was a reasonable choice in preliminary experiments. 2 In all FedAvg experiments, we used a local batch size of B = 8, an unroll size of 10 tokens, and made E = 1 passes over the local dataset; thus FedAvg processes 80 tokens per batch, thus processing a user's 1600 tokens in 20 batches. Figure 1 investigates the impact of changing the estimator used for the average per-round update, as well as replacing a fixed sample of C = 100 users per round to a variable-sized batch formed by sampling each user with probability of q = 100/763430 for an expectation ofC = 100 users. None of these changes significantly impacted the convergence rate of the algorithm. In particular, the fixed denominator estimatorf f works just as well as the higher-sensitivity clipped-denominator estimatorf c . Thus, in the remaining experiments we focus on estimatorf f . Next, we investigate the impact of flat and per-layer clipping on the convergence rate of FedAvg. The model has 11 parameter vectors, and for per-layer clipping we simply chose to distribute the clipping budget equally across layers with S j = S √ 11 . Figure 3 shows the accuracy achieved after 100, 500, and 3000 rounds of training at a range of clipping values. We see that for a total L 2 bound in the range 10.0 -20.0 clipping has at most a small effect on convergence rate (it may even help slightly). In this regime, flat clipping slightly outperforms per-layer clipping.
The final ingredient is the addition of noise. Figure 4 shows the impact of various levels of percoordinate Gaussian noise N (0, σ 2 ) added to the average update. Early in training, we see almost no loss in convergence for a noise of σ = 0.024; later in training noise has a larger effect, and we see a small decrease in convergence past σ = 0.012. These experiments, where we sample only an expected 100 users per round, are not sufficient to provide a meaningful privacy guarantee. We have S = 20.0 andC = qW = 100, so the sensitivity of estimator 1 is 20/100.0 = 0.2. Thus, to use the moments accountant with z = 1, we would need to add noise σ = 0.2 (dashed red vertical line), which destroys accuracy.
Estimating the accuracy of private models for large datasets Continuing the above example, if instead we choose q soC = 1250, set the L 2 norm bound S = 15.0, then we have sensitivity 15/1250 = 0.012, and so we add noise σ = 0.012 and can apply the moments account with noise scale z = 1. The computation is now significantly more computationally expensive, but will give a guarantee of (1.35, 10 −6 )-differential privacy after 3000 rounds of training (or simultaneously (1.97, 10 −9 )-differential privacy).
Because running such experiments is so computationally expensive, for experimental purposes it is useful to ask: does using an expected 1250 users per round produce a model with different accuracy than a model trained with only 100 expected users per round? If the answer is no, we can train a model withC = 100 and a particular noise level σ, and use that model to estimate the utility of a model trained with a much larger q (and hence a much better privacy guarantee). We can then run the moments accountant (without actually training) to numerically upper bound the privacy loss.
To investigate this possibility, we first ran a baseline experiment where we used the exact weighted average estimator and sample exactly C users per round, varying C. Figure 5 shows diminishing returns beyond C = 50 or 100 users per round. Next, we trained two models, both with S = 15 and ; recall the first model achieves a vacuous privacy guarantee, while the second achieves (1.35, 10 −6 )-differential privacy after 3000 rounds. Figure 6 show the two models produce almost identical accuracy curves during training. Using this observation, we can use the accuracy of models trained withC = 100 to estimate the utility of private models trained with much largerC. Figure 2 compares the true-average fixed-sample baseline model from Figure 1 with models that use varying levels of clipping S and noise σ atC = 100. Using the above approach, we can use these experiments to estimate the utility of LSTMs trained with differential privacy for different sized datasets and different values ofC. Table 2 shows representative values settingC so that z = 1. For example, the model with σ = 0.003 and S = 15 is only worse than the baseline by an additive −0.13% in AccuracyTop1 and achieves (4.6, 10 −9 )-differential privacy when trained with C = 5000 expected users per round. As a point of comparison, we have observed that training on a different corpus can cost an additive −2.50% in AccuracyTop1. 3 Adjusting noise and clipping as training progresses Figure 2 shows that as training progresses, each level of noise eventually becomes detrimental: σ = 0.024 has no effect until AccuracyTop1 reaches about 13% but slows convergence after that, σ = 0.012 doesn't hurt until AccuracyTop1 reaches 14.5%, and so on. This suggests using a smaller σ and correspondingly smaller S (thus fixing z so the privacy cost of each round is unchanged) as training progresses. Results for such an experiment are shown in Figures 7 and 8 . We indeed observe that early in training (left plot), S in the 10 -12.6 range works well (σ = 0.006 -0.0076). In the right plot, we start from a baseline model, and see that switching to S = 7.9 and σ = 0.0048 performs better.
Experiments with SGD We also ran experiments using FedSGD taking B = 1600, that is, computing the gradient on each user's full local dataset. To allow more iterations in the simulation, we usedC = 50 rather than 100. Examining Figures 9 and 10 , we see S = 2 and σ = 2·10 −3 are reasonable values, which suggests for private training we would need in expectation qW = S/σ = 1500 users per round, whereas for FedAvg we might choose S = 15 and σ = 10 −2 forC = qW = 1000 users per round. That is, the relative effect of the ratio of the clipping level to noise is similar between FedAvg and FedSGD. However, FedSGD takes a significantly larger number of iterations to reach equivalent accuracy. Fixing z = 1,C = 5000 (the value that produced Table 3 : Count histograms recording how many of a model's (row's) top 10 predictions are found in the n = 10, 50, or 100 most frequent words in the corpus. Models that predict corpus top-n more frequently have more mass to the right. Figure 9 , a smaller value would actually be better when doing private training). FedSGD is more sensitive to noise than FedAvg, likely because the updates are smaller in magnitude.
the best accuracy for a private model in Table 2 ) and total of 763,430 users gives (3.81, 10 −9 )-DP after 3000 rounds and (8.92, 10 −9 )-DP after 20000 rounds, so there is indeed a significant cost in privacy to these additional iterations.
Models with larger dictionaries
We repeated experiments on the impact of clipping and noise on models with 20000 and 30000 token dictionaries, again using FedAvg training with η = 6, equally weighted users with 1600 tokens, andC = 100 expected users per round. Interestingly, the larger dictionaries give only a modest improvement in accuracy, and do not require changing the clipping and noise parameters despite having significantly more parameters. Results are given in Figures 11  and 12 .
Comparing DP and non-DP models The introduction of noise to the training procedure does not appear to affect the model's overall predictive accuracy. However, it might still have a qualitative affect on the nature of the predictions. Specifically, we hypothesized that noising updates might bias the model away from rarer words (whose embeddings get less frequent actual updates and hence are potentially more influenced by noise) and toward the common "head" words with more support in the dataset.
To evaluate this "headedness" hypothesis, we computed next word predictions on a sample of the test set using a variety of models. At each s t we intersect the top 10 model predictions with the most frequent 10, 50, 100 words in the dictionary. So for example, an intersection of size two in the top 50 means two of the model's top 10 predictions are in the 50 most common words in the dictionary. We then compute a histogram of these counts to provide a snapshot summary of how biased a particular model is toward common vocabulary items. Table 3 summarizes these histograms. We find that better models (higher AccuracyTop1) tend to use fewer head words. But the other parameters varied in our privacy experiments have at most a minimal affect on the model's preference toward head words. Specifically, neither the number of users (100 vs 1250 as in Figure 6 ) nor the amount of noise added during training (sampling the x-axis in Figure 4 ) affect the models' bias toward head words. 4 Other experiments We experimented with adding an explicit L 2 penalty on the model updates (not the full model) on each user, hoping this would decrease the need for clipping by preferring updates with a smaller L 2 norm. However, we saw no positive effect from this.
Conclusions
In this work, we introduced an algorithm for user-level differentially private training of large neural networks, in particular a complex sequence model for next-word prediction. We empirically evaluated the algorithm on a realistic dataset and demonstrated that such training is possible at a negligible loss in utility, instead paying a cost in additional computation. Such private training, combined with federated learning (which leaves the sensitive training data on device rather than centralizing it), shows the possibility of training models with significant privacy guarantees for important real world applications. Much future work remains, for example designing private algorithms that automate and make adaptive the tuning of the clipping/noise tradeoff, and the application to a wider range of model families and architectures, for example GRUs and character-level models.
